How Are Competition Laws Heating Up in the Middle East? An Insider’s Guide to the Recent Surge in Legislation and Enforcement

Introduction and background[1]

Antitrust regulation has been a relatively recent phenomenon in the Middle East compared to the well-established legal frameworks in the United States (the Sherman Act, 1890) and the European Union (EU) (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The region’s national competition laws were all introduced (well) after the EU rules and many have been influenced by them: Middle Eastern countries introduced their first competition laws between 1988 and 2022, starting with Israel (1988) and ending with Lebanon (2022), highlighting a gradual regional adoption of such laws over three decades. (Tunisia was the first Arab country that adopted competition specific legislation in 1991.)

According to the latest report by the United Nations (UN) which evaluates the robustness of Arab competition legislation against international standards (“ABLF Report”), the Arab region advanced its ranking from “Moderate” in 2020 to “Developed” in 2023.[2] In particular, for the six Arab countries making up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the KSA, and the UAE), the average score enhanced from “Developed” to “Strong” due to legislative amendments in Kuwait, Oman, and the KSA.[3] Only two countries, Egypt and the KSA, outranked others and obtained the highest score “Very Strong” in 2023.

While the ABLF Report confirms a trend for increased competition legislation across the Middle East, its classifications do not reflect the enforcement level of competition laws.

We view the Turkish Competition Authority as active and engaged, comparable to its counterparts in the EU or US, and acknowledge its evolving approach to complex economic reasoning and theories of harm in its decisions. Meanwhile, we observe substantial divergence across the Middle East, ranging from no practical enforcement (e.g., Iraq and Syria) or only basic enforcement (e.g., Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Yemen) to an increasingly sophisticated and rigorous approach (especially the KSA).

This article covers the following selected 14 countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Palestine, the KSA, Syria, the UAE, and Yemen (together the “Middle East” or the “region”). References to the “Arab region” or “Arab countries”, on the other hand, comprise the 22 Arab League member states (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, the KSA, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, Yemen). For the benefit of comparison, we occasionally draw comparisons with the EU, Turkish, and Egyptian competition law frameworks to provide additional context and insights.

This article analyzes key competition law and policy advances in the Middle East, by setting out the legislative evolution and delving into recent developments (2018–2024). We will (i) first discuss the jurisdictions whose competition regime we view as still in the early stages of development, followed by (ii) jurisdictions whose competition authorities we observe to be increasingly rigorous, and (iii) a deep dive into:

1. the KSA, where enforcement has continuously strengthened since its antitrust reform in 2019; and
2. the UAE, which has revamped its competition law at the end of last year, 2023.

We will conclude with a forecast for the region. In brief, considering the recent uptick in antitrust developments, coupled with continued projected economic growth, enforcement of competition rules in the Middle East will only strengthen. To the extent that this will safeguard competitive markets, this is to be welcomed. Given the KSA’s and the UAE’s priority of creating a conducive investment climate, fears of an unduly interventionist approach by antitrust regulators in the Middle East seem misplaced, at least for now. That said, the broad jurisdictional scope of the KSA’s merger control, which often triggers filing obligations even for transactions with a limited direct nexus to the KSA, remains an important consideration.

Read the full publication on the Kluwer Competition Law Blog.